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1. Introduction
In a sport that is linked with betting and its associated problems, British
horseracing is internationally renowned for its quality, diversity and integrity.
It is the second most popular sport in Britain, with nearly 6 million spectators
watching it live andmillions more watching at home, including a TV audience
of 10 million for the Grand National each year. Racehorse owners spend
£275 million for the excitement of watching their horses race.1 British horse-
racing also provides the punter’s favourite bet, leaving bookmakers with a gross
win of over £1 billion, 10 per cent of which is put back into the sport. It is a key
feature of the competitive analysis that three such diverse sets of consumers
(spectators, owners and punters) buy into the same British horseracing product.
This is the reason for calling it a multi-sided sport in the title to this chapter.
Successful sports are built on strong governance, which is necessary to keep
the competition exciting and free from corruption. Sports with weak, frag-
mented governance structures tend to lose public interest (e.g. boxing, wres-
tling). The fact that British horseracing has had a uniﬁed governance structure
for over 250 years is undoubtedly one of the contributing factors to its success.
As one might expect over such a long period, a fairly lengthy set of regulations
has been developed to govern the rules of individual races and the control of
race, ﬁxture and commercial rights. These rules and regulations are known as
the ‘Orders and Rules of British Horseracing’, some of which were challenged
by the UK Ofﬁce of Fair Trading (OFT) as anticompetitive agreements under
Chapter 1 of the Competition Act 1998 (equivalent to Article 81EC).
1 They recover only a third of this in prize money and sponsorship.
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The competition issues under review in this chapter concern those Orders
and Rules which had the effect of creating joint-selling rights in dealing with
bookmakers, limiting the rights of individual racecourses to run ﬁxtures
whenever they want and restricting relative prize money across races.2 Such
issues get to the tension between ensuring good governance and creating
cartel-like restrictions. This is where economic analysis is necessary to deter-
mine which rules are necessary for good governance and which are not.
A recurring theme in this chapter is that good governance in sport requires
the appropriate treatment of externalities, which may be either positive
(e.g. betting opportunities for bookmakers) or negative (e.g. inappropriate
prize money in one race distorting incentives in another). A particularly
important network externality is that the pleasure of horseracing for punters
depends on the number and quality of horses in training (i.e. the number of
owners and how much they spend).3 A famous idea in economics, known as
the Coase Theorem, sets out the conditions under which bilateral bargaining
can eliminate the inefﬁciencies associated with externalities. As we shall see,
these conditions are unlikely to hold in the absence of certain of the Orders
and Rules because property rights would be too fragmented and uncertain and
transaction costs would be high.
This case illustrates an important lesson for the practical application of
competition policy. Restrictive agreements should not be considered exclu-
sively from the perspective of their potential to create distortions, because
many such agreements have a beneﬁcial, efﬁciency-enhancing purpose. In
such situations, it is necessary to consider the net beneﬁt to consumers and act
only against those agreements that are harmful or unnecessarily restrictive.4
More speciﬁcally, economists have become increasingly aware that there are
important cases where more than one group of consumers gains beneﬁt from
the same product. While all such groups have similar interests in being able to
buy into a high-quality product (or interface or platform or sport), the
structure of prices (i.e. who contributes how much to funding the British
horseracing product) can directly affect not only the distribution of beneﬁts
but also the design and quality of the product itself. In the case of horseracing,
2 Joint-selling of betting rights is similar to, but as we shall see importantly different from, the sale of media
rights. For a short summary of competition issues in the sale of media rights in football, see Hatton et al.
(2007).
3 A network externality arises when the value of the product to one consumer depends on the number of
others. This is a cross-group externality when the beneﬁt to one group of consumers depends on the
number of consumers in another distinct group.
4 A similar point is emphasised by Motta in Chapter 1 and Rey and Venit in Chapter 11. See also EAGCP
(2005) for the economic approach to competition policy.
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a central issue is that a higher price charged to bookmakers for being able to
take bets on British horseracing automatically feeds through to a lower price
for owners and better quality racing for spectators. The reverse holds if
bookmakers contribute less. Careful economic analysis is necessary to identify
a benchmark optimum price structure and to understand the consequences of
alternative structures for each group of consumers.5
With this last point in mind, section 2 discusses the preferences of the main
groups of consumers. Section 3 introduces the roles of some key institutions of
British horseracing. Section 4 summarises the statement of objections (known
as a ‘Rule 14 Notice’) by the relevant UK competition authority – the Ofﬁce of
Fair Trading. My own economic analysis is set out in section 5. Section 6
summarises the outcome of the case, both in terms of the modernisation of
British horseracing and what has happened in various UK and European
courts. It also provides a brief conclusion.
2. The consumers of British horseracing6
The aim of competition policy
The principal objective of modern competition policy is to ensure that markets
operate competitively in the interests of consumers. The OFT sums this up
admirably in its mission as stated in successive annual reports and highlighted
in its web home page headline: ‘Making markets work well for consumers.’7
The obvious ﬁrst question to ask is, what are consumers buying? For most
sports, it is rarely a single event such as an isolated race or self-standing
football match that creates the thrill. The excitement is generated by a sporting
competition which links results in different events. In the case of horseracing,
there is no major league or knock-out cup, but horses develop their ratings to
qualify for more highly rated events. Their form in one race also matters for
handicapping in later races which may be run at any racecourse. Furthermore,
the integrity of races run under a common governance structure underpins
consumer conﬁdence. This suggests a product deﬁnition of British horse-
racing, not an isolated race or day of racing, but an interlinked programme
over the season. We return to this after considering consumers in more detail.
5 See Armstrong and Wright in Chapter 3 and Rochet in Chapter 7 for other examples of competition
policy applied to two-sided markets.
6 Many of the ﬁgures used in this section can now be found in Deloitte (2006).
7 Emphasis in original.
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What is the deﬁnition of a consumer? Generally speaking, we expect
consumers to be the ones who spend money in order to enjoy the product,
as distinct from producers who receive income in return for providing the
product. This is a fairly straightforward deﬁnition for markets with a single
category of consumer, but the concept is not so straightforward in a multi-
sided market. When different groups of consumers are buying into the same
product or ‘platform’ created with a large element of ﬁxed costs, there are
many possible ‘prices’ that could generate the same level of funding.8
However, this does not mean that all such sets of prices are equally good
because they may affect the quality of the product itself. Put another way, the
structure of prices matters. This theme is picked up in section 5.
How should the interests of different groups of consumers be weighted?
Given the difﬁculty of making interpersonal comparisons of utility, it seems
reasonable to claim that any weights attached to groups of consumers should
be non-negatively related to their total spending (i.e. ﬁnancial contribution to
the creation of the product) – those who spendmore should not be considered
less worthy than those who spend less on the product. For example, it would
be inappropriate to consider the effect of a particular rule on bookmakers
independently of its effect on owners and spectators.
Consumers and consumer preferences
At the time of the case in 2003, there were around 9,000 racehorse ownerswith
13,000 horses in training. It cost around £17,000 p.a. to keep a horse in
training and average prize money was only £6,000. The average price of a
horse bought at two principal auction ﬁrms in Britain in 2005 was £28,000
(Deloitte, 2006). Although a very exceptional few horses go on to earn their
owners a fortune at stud, most have a very much lower resale value.9
Racehorses are not attached to particular racecourses but kept and trained
at trainers’ yards and raced at different courses across the country.
8 For example, newspapers typically sell advertising space to advertisers and content to readers. For some
newspapers, the spend of each group is similar, but others vary enormously in the ﬁnancial contribution
of advertisers and readers. At one extreme, ‘free newspapers’ get all their revenue from advertisers and at
the other extreme readers pay for ‘free ads’ papers. Armstrong andWright (see Chapter 3) refer to this as
a ‘waterbed effect’ when a similar total revenue can be collected from different consumer groups in
various alternative proportions.
9 The vast majority of owners have horses that fall into the latter category and can have no reasonable
expectation of increasing their wealth through horseracing. Consequently, it is conservative to ignore the
cost of horses and focus on training costs when considering the ﬁnancial contribution of owners.
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There were ﬁfty-nine racecourses in Britain, including ﬂat and national hunt
(i.e. jumping) courses, at which spectators could watch horseracing. The highest
quality of racing is on grass, but some courses have built all-weather tracks in
recent years. The amount of racing on a grass course is strictly limited in any
one period because it needs to recover from being cut up by galloping horses.
All-weather tracks do not have this constraint. Most courses are individually
owned, but there are three signiﬁcant racecourse groups: Racecourse Holdings
Trust (RHT) (thirteen courses), Northern Racing (nine courses) and Arena
(seven courses including three with all-weather tracks). In 2003, there were
1,220 ﬁxtures at which just over 8,000 races were run and a total of £94 million
in prize money was on offer, 80 per cent of which went to winning owners.
A very distinctive feature of horseracing is its link with the betting industry.
Punters enjoy a bet on the races, either on-course, in off-course betting shops
or increasingly on the internet. At the time of the case, in 2002/3, the gross
win (i.e. revenue less payout) for bookmakers on British horseracing was
£858 million, which was 42 per cent of their gross win from all betting.10 In
recognition of this, the betting industry makes a substantial ﬁnancial con-
tribution to horseracing through the Levy (see below). This is used mainly for
prize money to attract racehorse ownership, but also to fund integrity services
and other support for horses and courses.11
Based on expenditure shares in 2000, the net ﬁnancial contributions of the
various consumer groups into British horseracing worked out at owners (via
training fees, keep, vets’ fees, etc. net of prize money) 50 per cent, punters (via the
Levy) 25 per cent, spectators (via racecourse attendance) 18 per cent, and sponsors
andmedia (who aremostly interested in access to owners, punters and spectators)
7 per cent. In this context, although owners are less numerous than punters or
spectators, theyhavea strongclaimtobeing themost important consumergroup.12
10 Football, ﬁxed-odds computer bets and other sources are now increasing the non-horseracing share, but
British horseracing is still seen as a particularly attractive bet for punters. As recently as 1999, the British
horseracing share of turnover (i.e. not quite equivalent to gross win) had been 70 per cent and latest
ﬁgures for 2004/5 show it reduced to 38 per cent of gross win. However, this should be seen in the context
of rapid growth in all betting so gross win on British horseracing had grown to £1.12 billion by 2004/5.
11 This is a very much smaller proportion of betting turnover than is contributed in other countries such as
France, the US or Hong Kong (data from the International Federation of Horseracing Authorities). One
consequence is that prize money is a lower proportion of training costs in Britain. Highest levels of prize
money are available in countries with a state-sponsored tote or betting monopoly, which contrasts with
the competitive British betting industry.
12 There are many other non-consumer interests, most of whom make their living out of horseracing,
including trainers, jockeys, stable lads, transport drivers, vets, etc. These are sometimes referred to as ‘the
industry’. Breeders merit a particular mention because horseraces are a crucial testing ground for their
breeding skills, and true-run races provide important information in the continuing search for the best
possible racehorse (known as ‘improvement of the breed’).
196 Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/386783/WORKINGFOLDER/LYO/9780521886048C08.3D 197 [192–216] 16.6.2009 11:53AM
While owners are very direct consumers, punters enjoy horseracing
through the bookmaking intermediary. We adopt the standard convention
in competition law and economics that direct customers (e.g. bookmakers)
have an incentive to represent the interests of consumers who buy through
them (e.g. punters), as long as they act competitively. A similar point may be
made in relation to racecourses and spectators. This association between
intermediate business customer and ﬁnal consumer is not entirely unproble-
matic but it is a useful starting point.
Having identiﬁed the various consumers, it is useful to reﬂect on what they
value from horseracing. Independent market research provides a guide to
spectator utility functions. They value true-run races, competitive balance, seeing
the fastest horses in the world, accurate information to help predict results,
diversity of races and spectacle and glamour. Owners enjoy much the same
attributes, but magniﬁed by the vicarious pleasure of participating in a sport and
added trips to the trainer’s yard to plan their horse’s campaign (i.e. season’s
races). As an indication of punter preferences, there is unpublished econometric
evidence (commissioned by bookmakers) that betting increases with TV cover-
age, racing on a British racecourse, large ﬁelds (i.e. ten-plus runners), high prize
money (i.e. higher quality of racing), turf (i.e. grass as distinct from all-weather
tracks) and handicap races (i.e. more uniform spread of odds). Punters, specta-
tors and owners all rely on racehorse form (results), built up across previous
races at different racecourses, to predict results and plan campaigns.
Thus, the same essential qualities are valued by different groups of consu-
mers, though not necessarily with the same weightings. For example, owners
generally prefer smaller race ﬁelds (and so a better chance of winning) than do
punters (who dislike short-odds favourites). It is central to understanding this
case that the core product each group of consumers is enjoying is the pro-
gramme of races which costs half a billion pounds to put on each year. This is the
‘platform’ into which each of the consumer groups buys. The central competi-
tion issue is the extent to which an appropriately representative governing body
is necessary to design horseracing for its various consumers and whethermarket
mechanisms can be designed to deliver a more consumer-responsive product.
3. The institutions governing British horseracing
Different aspects of horseracing and its funding were coordinated by three key
institutions: the Jockey Club, the British Horseracing Board (BHB) and the
Horserace Betting Levy Board (HBLB).
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The Jockey Club was formed in 1752 and governed most aspects of British
horseracing until 1993. At the time of the case, it still governed sporting rules
relating to the conduct of individual races (e.g. licensing of individuals, horses
and courses; common standards across racecourses; anti-doping and main-
taining integrity on- and off-course; veterinary care). Alongside its regulatory
functions, it owned a portfolio of thirteen racecourses under the name of
RHT.13 The Jockey Club was a not-for-proﬁt organisation with all its net
income going to support horseracing and the development of the thor-
oughbred as a breed. It had a charitable function in looking after retired and
injured human and equine participants in horseracing.14
In 1993, BHB was formed to take over commercial activities and the sport’s
overall coordination and organisation (e.g. funding, the ﬁxture list, race
planning, liaison with the betting industry and HBLB, marketing, strategic
planning). BHB distributed no proﬁts to its members, but invested all its
income in the interests of the sport (racing, breeding and veterinary science).
An important feature of BHB decision making was that it was representative
of both regulatory and consumer interests, with the exception of the betting
industry with which it negotiated at the HBLB.15
The OFT case mainly focused on those Orders and Rules of British
Horseracing which enabled BHB to negotiate funding with bookmakers and
determine ﬁxtures and race planning. Owners, racecourses and others must
accept these regulations if they want to take part in the races BHB puts on. The
overall effect of these rules appears to give BHB considerable power over
which courses can have ﬁxtures at what times and the prize money for races
run under different conditions, as well as in negotiating with bookmakers. In
practice, the power to determine the ﬁxture list is very severely constrained by
implicit ‘grandfather rights’ of racecourses to keep their ﬁxtures from one year
to the next and by bookmakers through negotiations at the HBLB.
Since 1961, the HBLB has been the statutory body (i.e. set up by govern-
ment) which assesses and collects a monetary contribution (i.e. the Levy) from
13 The Racecourse Holdings Trust courses include four which host some of the most famous races in the
world: Aintree (Grand National), Cheltenham (Gold Cup), Epsom (Derby and Oaks) and Newmarket
(2000 and 1000 Guineas).
14 This was the governance structure at the time of the case but it has since changed. All remaining
regulatory functions of the Jockey Club have been brought together with BHB to create the British
Horseracing Authority (BHA). For the economic role set out in this chapter, the BHA has effectively the
same role as BHB.
15 BHB policy was determined by a thirteen-person board of directors, appointed by the following: Jockey
Club (three), Industry Committee (two), Racecourse Association (RCA) (two), Racehorse Owners
Association (two), Thoroughbred Breeders Association (one) and the board itself appointed a chairman,
another independent director and the chief executive.
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bookmakers in support of the attractive betting opportunity that British
horseracing provides.16 It determines the size of the Levy in conjunction
with incentives to provide a ﬁxture list that suits the bookmakers. Under the
mediation of an independent HBLB chair, representatives of BHB negotiate
with representatives of the Bookmakers’ Committee (a committee of leading
bookmakers and bookmakers’ associations). Formally, the Bookmakers’
Committee makes an annual proposal to the HBLB with a view to BHB
agreeing to provide a ﬁxture list that suits bookmaker interests (i.e. regular
races of sufﬁcient quality spread out across the week).17
The UK government’s role in horseracing and the betting industry appears
anomalous, so it was receptive to proposals that would allow disengagement
without harming the sport.18 What was needed was a mechanism for BHB to
prevent bookmakers from freeriding on British horseracing and they came up
with a creative proposal. Since bookmakers need precise information on runners,
riders and associated pre-race data in order to take bets on races, BHB proposed
to sell this data to bookmakers as a replacement for the Levy.19 This new
‘commercial mechanism’ was phased in over a period of ﬁve years from 2001,
with the amount charged for supplying pre-race data being set against the
Levy. The intention was that this would allow the HBLB to be abolished in
2005 (i.e. once the robustness of this commercial mechanism had been tested).
The price for the data was on exactly the same basis as the Levy (i.e. a
proportion of each bookmaker’s gross win on British horseracing) but this
proportion rose under the commercial mechanism and stabilised at around 10
per cent of the gross win on British horseracing. The increasing importance of
the Levy at the time of the case (2000–4) is shown in Figure 8.1.20
16 In 1928, the Tote was established by Act of Parliament with a statutorymonopoly in non-ﬁxed odds pool
betting and the requirement to distribute its proﬁts for ‘purposes conducive to the improvement of
breeds of horses or the sport of horseracing’. HBLB was established in anticipation of the legalisation of
high-street betting shops in 1962. It brought together contributions from the ﬁxed-odds high-street
bookmakers and Tote proﬁts.
17 If there is a failure to agree, the Secretary of State (i.e. a government minister) is required to decide and
this is usually a sufﬁcient threat for agreement to be reached.
18 Having said this, there is far less government intervention in British horseracing than in almost any other
jurisdiction. The UK government was also looking for ways to privatise the Tote without compromising
the funding of British horseracing. A private sale at a discount to the Racing Trust (a consortium
including BHB, the Jockey Club and RCA) was blocked by the European Commission on state-aid
grounds (competition policy has a pervasive effect!) and the proposal at the time of writing is to sell the
Tote on the open market.
19 At the time of the case, BHB’s property (database) rights on pre-race data, which are essential if it is to be
sold at an appropriate price, had been conﬁrmed in the High Court (2001) when challenged by William
Hill (a leading bookmaker). This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal in 2005.
20 The increase is substantially attributable to a change in betting tax in the 2001 budget away from a 9 per
cent tax on bets taken (which punters saw as directly reducing their odds, i.e. raising the price of a bet) in
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Part of the Levy goes to fund integrity services and other support for
horseracing and race courses, and around 60 per cent goes into the prize
fund. £100 million p.a. provides ample incentive for a wide range of interests
to use whatever legal means might be available (including competition law
and IPR law) to increase their slice of the cake even if, as we shall see, their
actions if successful would lead to a product less attractive to consumers (i.e. a
smaller cake may be baked). Bookmakers lobbied hard with the OFT and
divisions arose between racecourses.
4. The OFT Statement of Objections
In summer 2000, BHB and the Jockey Club notiﬁed to the OFT the Orders
and Rules and other agreements which govern British horseracing in order to
gain clearance that they did not infringe competition law. Eventually, in
April 2003, the OFT issued what is known as a Rule 14 Notice, setting out
a Statement of Objections under Chapter 1 of the Competition Act (i.e.
equivalent to EC Article 81). The full Rule 14 Notice contains conﬁdential
information, but a non-conﬁdential informal summary was issued at the
same time:
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Figure 8.1 Trend in betting’s contribution to British horseracing
Source: HBLB website.
favour of a less distortionary 15 per cent tax on a bookmaker’s gross win (i.e. the difference between bets
taken and winnings paid out). In addition to this tax-related increase in betting, the proposed price of
pre-race data now came from BHB, not the Bookmakers’ Committee, which improved BHB’s relative
bargaining power. The formal Levy adjusted to the price of pre-race data.
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‘In essence, the OFT has taken the preliminary view that certain Orders and Rules
infringe the [Competition] Act on the grounds that they have the combined
effect of:
 limiting the freedom of racecourses to organise their racing, in particular by ﬁxing
how often and at what times they stage races and the type of race they stage;
 ﬁxing the amounts that racecourses must offer owners to enter their horses in a
race; and
 monopolising the supply of race and runners data to bookmakers by foreclosing
competition from alternative suppliers.’21
The inﬂuence of the Orders and Rules in regulating race ﬁxtures and types,
prize money and the sale of pre-race data was not in dispute. The dispute was
over who were the relevant consumers and the impact on consumer welfare.
The OFT accepted that the application of competition rules to a sport must be
sensitive to the distinctive characteristics of that sport so that ‘certain sporting
rules will not infringe the Chapter 1 prohibition if they are essential to enable
the sport to operate’ (OFT654, 2003, para. 2.1). However, it considered that
some consequences were hard-core market sharing and price ﬁxing and were
not essential to achieving the sporting objectives. It made no serious attempt
to consider the implications of striking out the apparently offending Orders
and Rules (i.e. the counterfactual).
The OFT did attempt to deﬁne a relevant market for each of the three bullet
points above. It then proceeded by identifying the producers and customers in
each of its three deﬁned separate markets and drew the implication that there
should be no rules to interfere with the freedom of action of individual
producers in each market. In section 5, we argue that a fundamental problem
with the OFT’s original analysis is that it is inappropriate to consider horse-
racing as the sum of three independent markets.22 This commits the serious
mistake of applying one-sided logic to the analysis of a multi-sided product.
Before developing this point, however, we set out the OFT position on the
three ‘markets’ in a little more detail.
The ‘market for fixtures and programmes’
A ﬁxture is an event at a racecourse that contains a programme of ﬁve or six
races on a particular date. The programme refers to the number of races at a
21 OFT654, 2003, para. 1.5.
22 More precisely, the OFT position was that there were many other component markets (e.g. the market
for racehorse training), but these three were the ones for which it thought the Orders and Rules were
anticompetitive.
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ﬁxture, the conditions for each race (e.g. handicap versus equal weight
carried by horses; ﬂat racing versus national hunt over fences) and start
times. The OFT view was that racecourses are the natural producers of
ﬁxtures and so should be allowed to organise them whenever they individu-
ally perceive there to be the demand. New racecourses should also be free to
enter, and a healthy market should see weaker racecourses exit. This does
not happen. The number of racecourses had been stable at ﬁfty-nine with
neither entry nor exit for over half a century, which suggested that the
licensing system was over-restrictive. Basically, there was no mechanism to
reward efﬁcient racecourses and penalise those that were unattractive to
consumers.
The rules that were deemed anticompetitive included those preventing
racecourses, without BHB approval, from introducing new ﬁxtures even
when the course could physically take more, or holding a ﬁxture under the
same code (i.e. ﬂat versus jumps) at the same time as another racecourse if
located within ﬁfty miles. The OFT also argued that each racecourse should be
allowed to determine the content of a day’s racing, including running however
many races its track could safely run, at whatever time and with whatever
conditions on the race that it wanted.
The ‘market for British racing opportunities’
The OFT saw this as a separate market in which the racecourses supply
opportunities for owners (i.e. the customers) to race their horses. The price
of such opportunities has two main components: the stakes owners must pay
in order to enter a race and the prize money they might receive if their horse
wins or is highly placed. Various Orders and Rules restrict the range of stake
money and, quantitatively much more important, regulate prize money. Prize
money regulation has several dimensions, including minimum prize money
for a race, relative prize money across different classes of race (e.g. according
to the quality rating of horses) and amount of place money relative to the
winner’s prize. These were seen as classic price ﬁxing.
The ‘market for pre-race data’
Before bookmakers can take money on a race, they and their punters need to
know which horses are racing, the handicap weight being carried and pre-
ferably also who is riding each horse. Further important information includes
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each horse’s ‘form’ (i.e. recent results) and other details that may affect
judgements as to each horse’s chances of winning. Such information is
meticulously collated for BHB by a private company called Weatherbys.23
This information is provided free to newspapers to publicise race ﬁxtures.
However, from 2001 it was sold to bookmakers by BHB as part of the new
‘commercial mechanism’ to replace the Levy.
The OFT considered that BHB had created an effective monopoly in the
supply of this data because the notiﬁcation requirements in the Orders and
Rules mean that owners and trainers are obliged to notify Weatherbys of
which horses they propose to run in which races. If a race is oversubscribed,
Weatherbys follows ﬁxed priority (based mainly on a horse’s rating) and
balloting rules and notiﬁes owners whose horses are excluded from being
able to run in that race. The OFT claimed that these rules effectively excluded
racecourses or third parties from being able to sell their own pre-race data to
bookmakers and so prevented competition in the supply of data.
Some problems with the OFT’s Statement of Objections
The OFT analysis identiﬁed three apparently independent ‘markets’. From
this perspective, it could see no connection, for example, between owners as
suppliers of racehorses for the ‘market for ﬁxtures and programmes’ and
owners as consumers of the ‘market for British racing opportunities’! It
provided no view of how the organisation and quality of British horseracing
would evolve in the absence of the offending Orders and Rules (i.e. the
counterfactual). There was no recognition of the pre-race data as a legitimate
property right over the overall British horseracing product, its role in the
commercial mechanism, or the consequences if several ﬁrms competed in the
supply of pre-race data. Finally, there was no appreciation of the beneﬁcial
effects of some of the key rules under challenge. Of course, the adoption of a
purely prosecutorial position might be seen as a legitimate strategy for a
competition authority operating in a court system, in order to encourage the
defendants to articulate and evaluate what the beneﬁts are. However, this is
not appropriate in a UK or EU-type administrative system where the author-
ity acts as judge and jury.
23 This is a family company that has a centuries-long relationship with horseracing. Since 1770 it has
traced the lineage of every racehorse and so has a crucial role in horse breeding. It also performs
banking functions for horseracing (e.g. related to stake and prize money) and prints racecards for the
courses.
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5. Economic analysis of the offending Orders and Rules
Several of the Orders and Rules challenged under the ‘market for ﬁxtures and
programmes’ were indeed overly restrictive, but others have essential incen-
tive and efﬁciency properties. Their prohibition would have fundamentally
devalued British horseracing. Economically the most important relate to the
sale of pre-race data, so this is the main emphasis of this chapter, though we
return to the role of other Orders challenged by the OFT at the end of this
section.
The betting externality and optimal bookmaker contribution to British horseracing24
In this section, we provide a simple model designed to capture the essential
features of the relationship between horseracing and bookmakers, in particu-
lar, the role of prize money in raising the quality of horseracing enjoyed by its
various consumers. The model allows us to conceptualise the contribution
from bookmakers that would maximise the beneﬁt of all consumers. It also
provides a benchmark from which to conduct a counterfactual analysis of
what would happen if certain Orders and Rules were prohibited. For simpli-
city, we focus on racehorse owners and bookmakers, leaving racecourses/
spectators and others in the background. However, a substantial proportion of
the Levy goes towards providing integrity services, vet science and racecourse
investment, for which very similar arguments apply.
A simple model of the betting externality25
Bookmakers make proﬁts on bets taken on races and these bets increase with
the number (and quality) of racehorses. Apart from providing more races on
which to bet, punters bet more on higher-proﬁle races, well-known horses and
races with larger ‘ﬁelds’ (i.e. more horses per race).26 To capture this, we write
24 This section is more technical than others in this chapter, but the text has been written with a view to it
being self-explanatory for those who prefer to avoid equations.
25 The formal approach taken here is similar to that in the recent literature on two-sided markets. See the
references given in Chapters 3 and 7. It differs in that the two-sided market literature has one or more
platform owners who set out to maximise proﬁts. The literature then examines the implications for
pricing structures. In the current context, it is more appropriate to model negotiations between different
groups with similar interests in developing a common product or ‘platform’. Nevertheless, the key ideas
of multiple groups of consumers and appropriate pricing structures in the presence of positive extern-
alities are essentially the same, and so too are the essential insights.
26 These assumptions reﬂect research by leading bookmakers.
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the ‘gross win’ for bookmakers as B(n) where n is the number of racehorses in
training and available to race. The more horses in racing, the greater the
beneﬁt to bookmakers: B0(n) = β(n) > 0.27 If bookmakers could not, for any
reason, take bets on British horseracing, they could offer punters alternative
betting opportunities (e.g. Italian horseracing, computer-generated horse-
racing, dog racing) on which they could expect a gross win of p. The ‘betting
externality’ is the positive contribution that is speciﬁc to British horseracing:
BðnÞ  p. If bookmakers also contribute P ≥ 0 to the prize fund for races, the
net beneﬁt to bookmakers is:28
p ¼ BðnÞ  p P (1)
Racehorse owners gain enjoyment out of seeing their horses race, and
particularly seeing them win. We write the (inverse) demand for racehorses
in training as v(n) with v0(n) < 0. Racehorse ownership is expensive, both the
original purchase of a horse and the costs of training and keep. We represent
the annualised cost as c per horse. Part of the cost is mitigated, at least in
expectation terms, by the opportunity to win prize money. On average, each
racehorse can expect to win P/n out of the bookmakers’ contribution to the
prize fund, so the net beneﬁt of owning the nth horse is u(n) = v(n)− c + P/n.29
The equilibrium number of horses in training is determined by where own-
ership of the marginal horse brings pleasure and expected prize money just
equal to the costs of ownership:
vðnÞ þ P=n ¼ c (2)
Lower costs or higher prize money encourage new owners into racing and
existing owners to keep more and better quality horses in training. In
particular:30
dn=dP ¼ 1= ðP=nÞ  nv0ðnÞ½ 40 (3)
To give an idea of the size of this prize-fund effect, the increased Levy
shown in Figure 8.1 was associated with a growth (2002–5) of: total prize
27 A prime denotes a partial derivative. There is diminishing marginal beneﬁt so β0(n) < 0.
28 In practice, the prize fund depends on the gross win, so we could write P= tβ(n) where t= 10 per cent is
the size of the Levy. It turns out that, because a lump-sum Levy has the same economic effect as a ‘proﬁts
tax’, we do not need to be concerned about the precise speciﬁcation of the prize fund.
29 Owners also contribute stakemoney for races, but this goes to the winner, so it does not affect the average
net beneﬁt of ownership. Average prize money per horse is over £6,000 p.a., though the distribution is
highly skewed, with the top ten horses winning £300,000–£800,000 each and many winning nothing.
There is no doubt, however, that most owners of the latter still have a positive expectation of winning!
30 This is derived by totally differentiating (2) and rearranging.
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money (net of owner contributions) of 20 per cent; and horses in training,
runners, races and ﬁxtures, each of between 11 per cent and 13 per cent. The
long-term effects are likely to be larger. There is also some evidence of an
increase in the quality of British-trained horses.31
Since there are n horses, the beneﬁt to owners as a group is:
UðnÞ ¼ VðnÞ  nc þ P (4)
where V(n) is the gross utility of racehorse ownership.32 Even without a prize
fund from the bookmakers, a lower level of horseracing would exist.We deﬁne
n as the number (and quality) of horses that would be in training if P= 0 and
the consequent beneﬁts to owners as U ¼ VðnÞ  nc.33
Before developing implications for negotiations between bookmakers and
owners, we establish the socially optimal outcome for this two-sided market
with a one-sided externality (i.e. bookmakers beneﬁt from racehorse owner-
ship but not directly vice versa). Consider what the optimal size (and quality)
of British horseracing, and so also the optimal prize fund, would be if we were
interested in maximising the joint beneﬁt of owners and bookmakers. Adding
(1) and (4):
ωðnÞ ¼ VðnÞ  nc þ BðnÞ (5)
This implies that the socially optimal number (and quality) of racehorses is
n*, which is found by solving:
vðnÞ þ βðnÞ ¼ c (6)
In words, the combined marginal beneﬁts to owners and bookmakers of an
extra horse should equal the marginal cost.34 Of course, the optimal design of
horseracing is a lot more complex than a single number, n*, and this is
discussed brieﬂy below, but for now it will serve as a simple measure of
31 It is very difﬁcult to measure quality but one international comparison casts light at least on the best
racehorses. If we calculate the difference between prize money won abroad by UK-trained horses and prize
money won in the UK by foreign-trained horses, and compare the 2004/6 average with the 2002/3 average,
this also grew by 13 per cent. All ﬁgures in this para. are taken from the BHB annual report (2005)
supplemented by the BHB (2006) report on ‘Fixtures, Races and PrizeMoney’ available on its website. As the
Levy and prize money have reduced more recently, there is evidence of these effects reversing (BHA, 2007).
32 Formally, V(n) is the integral of v(n) over the n horses. Non-marginal owners obtain positive consumer
surplus which is measured by U(n).
33 Formally, from (2), n solves vðnÞ ¼ c.
34 Note that v(n*)− c < 0 for (6) to hold which explains why extra prize money is necessary to bridge the
deﬁcit for owners. Prize money has no direct effect on ω because for every £1 that owners gain,
bookmakers lose the same. However, there is a crucial indirect effect because a higher prize fund
means more (and better quality) racehorses, which beneﬁts both owners and bookmakers.
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the overall quality of racing and facilitate discussion of the fundamental
economic issues.
The Coase Theorem does not hold for horseracing
The Coase Theorem states that if there are clearly deﬁned property rights and
in the absence of transaction costs, free negotiations should eliminate any
distortions due to an externality and so result in the optimal outcome (in this
case the optimal number and quality of racehorses).35 The intuition is that it is
mutually beneﬁcial for bookmakers and owners to get round a table to agree
on n*, which maximises joint utilities, and make a payment to compensate
owners for providing more races than they would otherwise do. This transfer
payment would only affect the distribution of utility between the parties (and
ensure that each gets at least their reservation utilities U and p).
The ﬁrst problemwith this is that it is not practical to negotiate directly over
n, which is determined by the decisions of thousands of owners. Even if it was
possible to negotiate with so many dispersed individuals, it is simply not
feasible to negotiate in a way that does not compromise the integrity of
racing – it is not credible to expect true-run races when bookmakers are
seen to be ‘bribing’ owners (even if for the best of motives). Owners have to
negotiate through an intermediary with the power to act on their behalf
(e.g. BHB). However, even then, the intermediary cannot force owners to
keep n* horses in training. This can only work indirectly through a prize fund
attracting ownership. The consequences are developed below, particularly
focusing on the fact that the quality of racing is not independent of the
distribution of bargaining power between owners and bookmakers.
An additional complication is that negotiations simultaneously take place
over the ﬁxture list and timing of races with a view to maximising the positive
betting externality (e.g. by having ﬁxtures throughout the week, every week
and spread out during the day, so that betting opportunities are enhanced).
This means that the negotiating intermediary must be able to deliver the
ﬁxture list as well as ownership incentives. This requires an intermediary who
can also represent racecourses.
In order for the intermediary to be able to represent these interests it must
have a secure ‘property right’ to be able to exclude bookmakers from taking
off-course bets on British horseraces; otherwise, it would have no bargaining
power. The Levy system acted equivalently and the ownership of pre-race
35 The classic references are Coase (1960) andWilliamson (1985), but the basic principles are set out in any
good intermediate microeconomics textbook.
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database rights was intended to enable commercial rights without the neces-
sity of government intervention through the HBLB. At the time of the case,
this key property right appeared to be in place and BHB had the ultimate right
to exclude bookmakers from taking bets on their races.36
Collective negotiations between BHB and the bookmakers
In order to understand the problems raised by the OFT’s ‘preliminary view’
that multiple suppliers should be free to provide competing databases, I set the
scene by considering the status-quo negotiations (i.e. as of 2003), with BHB
selling the right to take bets and the Bookmakers’ Committee buying this
right. The outcome of such bargaining is hard to predict precisely, but it is
instructive to consider the extremes, such as when one party can make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the other.
If bookmakers had all the bargaining power, maximising (1) gives the
implicit number of racehorses, nB, that they would want to support:37
½vðnBÞ þ nBv0ðnBÞ þ βðnBÞ ¼ c (7)
Equation (7) differs from (6) in that marginal revenue (i.e. the term in
square brackets) replaces the beneﬁt of the marginal owner. The second
element of the term in square brackets is negative which means that nB < n*.
In other words, from the perspective of all consumers, there would be too little
horseracing (of too low a quality) taking place. Thus, even with all the
bargaining power, bookmakers want to contribute to a limited prize fund in
order to bring more horses into racing and so generate a higher gross win on
the associated bets.38 However, there would be too little horseracing (and of a
quality that is too low).
At the other extreme, if BHB (acting on behalf of owners and spectators) had
all the bargaining power, the bookmakers would still have the option to stop
taking bets on British horseracing, and they would exercise this option if BHB
demanded too much. This ‘quit option’ is the key to considering what would
happen if owners could dictate terms to bookmakers. BHB could force net beneﬁt
down to zero, so from (1) it could press for Pmax ¼ BðnOÞ  p. We can ﬁnd the
number of racehorses this would bring into training by substituting into (2):
vðnOÞ þ Bðn
OÞ  p
nO
 
¼ c (8)
36 See footnote 19. 37 This expression follows after the substitution of (2) and (3).
38 The prize fund would be positive as long as nB4n, which is certainly the case for British horseracing.
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The ﬁrst term in square brackets is the average beneﬁt to bookmakers,
which exceeds the marginal beneﬁt so, by comparison with (6), this tends to
result in too many racehorses. However, the p term works in the opposite
direction, so the overall effect depends on the outside opportunities of book-
makers and may result in too little prize money.39 Combined with our result
when bookmakers can dictate terms, we ﬁnd:
n5nB5n  nO (9)
Thus, whatever the allocation of bargaining power, bookmakers will want
to invest a positive amount in racing, but if their bargaining power is strong,
they will invest too little. The efﬁciency of owners having maximum bargain-
ing power is less clear. As long as there is collective negotiation on both sides,
the bookmakers’ contribution is likely to lead to between nB and nO. The
actual outcome is then determined by relative negotiating skills and the
institutional setting of the bargaining process. We cannot say that this out-
come will be precisely the optimal n*. However, this analysis does give reason
to believe that the outcome is at least in the right ball park when there is
collective negotiation on both sides; BHB is able to exclude bookmakers from
taking bets on British horseracing and bookmakers are free to walk away.
It is helpful to illustrate issues in the following subsection with some rough
orders of magnitude to set the bounds of negotiation. The cost of ﬁlling daily
ﬁxture gaps in the racing calendar (i.e. ﬁxtures that would not happen in the
absence of bookmaker funding) might be achieved for around £20 million,
though this would not bring about high-quality racing. At the other extreme,
while bookmakers take a gross win of over £1 billion p.a. on British horse-
racing, there would undoubtedly be considerable substitution to other bets if
punters were prevented from betting on this. The extent of possible substitution
is possibly known by bookmakers, but if it is, it is a closely guarded commercial
secret. An educated guess might put the maximum bookmakers would con-
ceivably pay at £200 million, a ﬁgure which will serve for illustrative purposes.
The central conclusion of this section is that due to the positive externality
created for the betting industry by British horseracing, and the dispersed
decisions by owners, an efﬁcient market requires bookmakers to return a
substantial share of their proﬁts to invest in prize money and so enhance the
size and quality of racing: n5n.40 This contribution should be higher than
39 With a sufﬁciently strong outside option nO < n* and nB≤ nO. Inequality (9) assumes the bookmakers’
outside options are more limited.
40 This efﬁciency argument is quite separate from any moral case that beneﬁciaries should pay for positive
externalities.
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what bookmakers would provide on their own initiative: nB < n*. It is against
this broad background that we can evaluate the counterfactual, i.e. the con-
sequences of the OFT proposal to require disaggregated bargaining on the part
of horseracing interests, with each racecourse negotiating separately.
Implications of alternative institutional arrangements for negotiating over the betting
externality
Competition policy practitioners should carefully consider the economic
consequences of their actions. They need to be particularly careful when
there are beneﬁcial effects of apparently anticompetitive restrictions.
Consider the following alternative negotiating structures which represent
the range of possibilities that might have arisen depending on the precise
outcome of the OFT’s investigation.41 The ﬁrst four assume the continued
existence of clear property rights that permit BHB (or, for cases 3 and 4,
individual racecourses) to exclude bookmakers from taking bets unless prior
agreement has been reached:
1. BHB negotiates with collective bookmakers.
2. BHB negotiates with individual bookmakers.
3. Individual courses negotiate with collective bookmakers.
4. Individual courses negotiate with individual bookmakers.
5. No property rights for BHB (or racecourses) to exclude bets on British
horseracing.
1. BHB negotiates with collective bookmakers
This represents the status quo as already discussed. Both the racing side and
the betting side act collectively. If negotiations between two parties are
balanced, we expect that the beneﬁts will be shared roughly equally. Equal
monetary shares between the maximum and minimum contributions
by bookmakers would suggest a Levy (or sale of pre-race data) of around
£110 million (=½[£20m+£200m]).
2. BHB negotiates with individual bookmakers
Suppose the OFT had focused only on the collective bargaining of book-
makers, instead of the collective bargaining only of the racing side in its
41 The OFT was silent on whether bookmakers would continue to be able to negotiate collectively. We
separate out the consequences of ‘competitive provision of pre-race data’ because it would have
distinctive economic effects.
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Rule 14 Notice, and prohibited the Bookmakers’ Committee. This would have
allowed BHB to play off one bookmaker against another in order to extract the
full surplus of £200 million. It might even go further and offer exclusive
betting rights to one bookmaker, who would then be able to act as a monopo-
list (e.g. offering worse odds to punters). This might bring in even more
money for the racing side, but it would do so by exploiting punters.42
3. Individual courses negotiate with collective bookmakers
This would have been the most likely outcome if the OFT had pursued its
‘preliminary ﬁnding’ that racecourses should independently negotiate their
ﬁxtures and funding from bookmakers. If no single racecourse group was
essential to providing a full set of ﬁxtures required by the bookmakers, the
latter could play one off against the other to drive payment down to the
minimum £20 million. In effect, the bookmakers would design British horse-
racing with no account taken of other consumer interests.43
4. Individual courses negotiate with individual bookmakers
Large bookmakers would continue to fund certain ﬁxtures but only as long as
they could prevent rivals from freeriding on them. Bookmaker-funded ﬁx-
tures would be subject to exclusivity clauses, thus foreclosing smaller book-
makers. The effects would be to increase horizontal concentration amongst
bookmakers and vertical integration with racecourses. As with case 2, punters
would be faced with more expensive bets. With or without exclusivity, this set
of negotiations would create enormous coordination problems in the design
of the racing calendar because horses are not tied to courses in the UK. The
problems created by the absence of a single governing body coordinating and
creating sporting competition are vividly illustrated by the loss of consumer
interest in boxing when sanctioning bodies proliferated.
5. No property rights for BHB (or racecourses) to exclude bets on British horseracing
The OFT’s preliminary view was that the supply of pre-race data was being
monopolised by BHB and others should be given the right to sell it. Suppose
that competitive supply could be established. This would cost around
£5 million p.a. for each provider. If a genuinely contestable market could be
42 At present, British horseraces provide a ‘low price’ bet compared with other betting opportunities, i.e. an
odds-weighted bet on each horse in a race would on average return a punter a higher percentage of his
outlay than on alternative bets such as racing from another country, dog racing, etc. Of course, this
percentage is less than 100 per cent, so the bookmakers earn a proﬁt.
43 In terms of our formal analysis, this would result in nB.
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created, bookmakers could purchase at cost price. If acting collectively, they
would buy the data for £5 million, but none of this would contribute to the
ﬁxture programme for which they could then negotiate and fund as in case 3.
If acting individually, they would pay for the data, but no doubt freeride on
ﬁxtures with an outcome no better than in case 4. Of course, the idea of a
competitivemarket in pre-race data provision completely misses the point of a
commercial mechanism designed to replace the Levy. At best (i.e. if book-
makers act as a cartel) it would arrive at the unbalanced outcome of case 3,
and at worst (i.e. if bookmakers act individually) it would make everybody
worse off.
In practice, competitive data supply would be even worse than in cases
3 or 4. It is important that the details of pre-race data are accurate in order to
maintain the distinctive qualities of betting on British horseracing (e.g. many
punters get pleasure from studying information on a race before placing their
bets). The current system provides an extremely high level of accuracy with
very rapid internet dissemination of information which changes by the hour.
It is difﬁcult to envisage how this accuracy could be replicated by a third party
(e.g. trainers might not inform all data providers of entries and withdrawals)
and the loss of reputation for accuracy would be harmful all round. The
problem is even deeper in that, in the absence of a body representing the
collective interests of all those in racing, contributors to the database would
likely claim ownership of their own bits of data (e.g. owners’ racing colours or
entries, racecourses on race times, Jockey Club on handicaps) and the trans-
action costs of compilation would be enormous.
Conclusion on agreements that enable BHB to negotiate collectively
BHB is a not-for-proﬁt organisation that coordinates negotiations on behalf of
non-bookmaker interests. Sixty per cent of the Levy goes towards prize
money, thus cutting the price of racing for owners, and the remainder goes
towards integrity services, developing racecourse facilities for the beneﬁt of
spectators and improving the breed. The Levy is a betting-proﬁts tax and its
proposed replacement was a charge for data based on betting proﬁts. Neither
is signiﬁcantly distortionary for punters because it remains optimal for book-
makers to set the same odds that maximise their proﬁts, whether they keep
100 per cent or only 90 per cent. For this and other reasons, British horse-
racing offers punters amongst the lowest price of a bet.
The OFT proposals would have fragmented negotiations and undermined
property rights, with the consequence of unbalancing the outcome. With very
considerably reduced funding, the quality of British horseracing (the common
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product into which the various groups of consumers each buy) would be
greatly diminished. Furthermore, competition in the betting industry would
have been seriously undermined if individual negotiations had been required
and resulted in exclusive deals.
Coordination of fixtures and race planning
Another part of the OFT’s Statement of Objections (see section 4) related to
‘limiting the freedom of racecourses to organise their racing, in particular by
ﬁxing how often and at what times they stage races and the type of race they
stage’. There are good reasons to have an element of central planning of
ﬁxtures. Different groups of consumers have somewhat different preferences
over ﬁxtures. For example, bookmakers want racing all day every day, specta-
tors want weekend and Bank Holiday racing and owners need to plan a
campaign for their horses over the season. The matching of the needs of the
horse population and a suitable set of races, plus a relatively ﬁxed pot of
funding for prize money, cannot be achieved without an element of central
planning for ﬁxtures and race conditions. However, this raises the issue of
which racecourses should be able to run which ﬁxtures and whether competi-
tion could be beneﬁcially introduced.
Historically, ﬁxture allocation was determined by ‘grandfather rights’, i.e. if
you had a ﬁxture on the ﬁrst Friday in May last year, you have ﬁrst rights on it
this year. This had the inevitable consequence of freezing the number of
courses and limiting the incentive for each course to work at developing
sponsorship and facilities. Trade in ﬁxtures between racecourses was very
limited. Furthermore, there was a ‘ﬁfty-mile rule’ which prevented two meet-
ings from taking place on the same day at courses within ﬁfty miles of each
other. Some racecourses felt seriously constrained by these rules and lobbied
hard for their reform, while others were disturbed at the prospect of change.
While there are strong arguments for central planning of the general
pattern of ﬁxtures to meet the requirements of bookmakers and others, this
could be achieved with far less rigid rules. In particular, the ﬁfty-mile rule had
little economic justiﬁcation. Fixture allocation could also be freed up by an
auction system for ﬁxtures, with racecourses bidding for slots and revenues
going towards overall prize money. In this respect, the OFT objections
undoubtedly helped spur an emerging modernisation programme into action
by leading to undertakings to abolish these unnecessary restrictions and to
introduce rolling auctions for a subset of ﬁxtures that had no great tradition
(e.g. no auction of Derby Day which is traditionally run at Epsom).
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Integrity and prize money
The third OFT objection was that BHB should not restrict prize money for
particular races. The OFT implied that prize money should be used in an
unrestricted way by individual racecourses to attract horses to run, regardless
of the quality of the race. This would allow higher prizes for races run by
lower-grade horses than those rated more highly and so create severe incen-
tive problems, undermining the integrity of races (e.g. an owner would be
tempted to hold back a high-quality horse in some races in order to move
down the ratings and so qualify for a low-grade but higher prize money race
against weak opposition). Meritocratic prizes are particularly important for
the integrity of handicap races. Handicapping is a major element in the mix of
creating exciting races with attractive betting opportunities. It is essential to
the integrity of such races that horses have the incentive to be run true and so
provide information for handicapping on merit.44
6. Outcome and conclusion
This was a case that set some racecourses against the sport’s governing
authority. It also set bookmakers against the rest in a classic ﬁght over the
allocation of the spoils derived from taking bets on British horseracing. Some
very strong personalities and very old traditions were involved, using a very
new weapon of competition law.45 Modernisation was overdue but a careful
path needed treading if it was not to trample on what underpinned its success.
In June 2004, four years after original notiﬁcation, BHB reached agreement
with the OFT.46 The OFT was ultimately persuaded to withdraw its prelimin-
ary view that it should fragment British horseracing. It withdrew its challenge
to those Orders and Rules ‘monopolising’ the sale of pre-race data and
allowing the governing body to coordinate key elements of the overall shape
of ﬁxtures and race planning across the season. It also accepted the need for
44 In fact, the modernisation programme proposed a more, not less, rigorous approach to linking prizes to
race quality. Furthermore, unrestricted relative prize money would be impractical as a way of balancing
race sizes (which was the supposed justiﬁcation in the hypothesised ‘market for British racing oppor-
tunities’) because the supply of horses is very inelastic over the days or even hours necessary to ﬁll a race,
so the swings in prize money would have to be seriously large.
45 The UK Competition Act (1998) became operational from 1 March 2000 and introduced
almost identical prohibitions on anticompetitive agreements (Chapter 1) and abuse of dominance
(Chapter 2) to those in EC Articles 81 and 82 respectively.
46 OFT Case CP/1058/00 Notiﬁcation of Governance Agreements 28 June 2004.
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regulation of prize money in relation to race ratings. Two commitments were
agreed in relation to the sale of pre-race data. First, licensing arrangements
must be ‘on an open, non-discriminatory and non-exclusive basis, at a fair
market price’. Second, in the event of pricing disputes, an independent
‘arbitrator will be required to resolve the dispute having regard to the needs
of racing, the value of British horseracing to the bookmakers’ business and,
importantly, competition law’. BHB also proposed to link the allocation of
funding to the racecourses generating most betting revenue and to give them
more discretion to set race programmes (i.e. incentivising courses to provide
racing most attractive to punters). BHB further undertook to relax a number
of other Orders that could not be justiﬁed, for example, competition between
racecourses was enhanced by the abolition of the ﬁfty-mile rule, the introduc-
tion of a set of new ﬁxtures that BHB proposed to auction to racecourses on
three-year ‘leases’.47 Minimum prize money for the lowest-grade races was
also adjusted to facilitate more racing for less able racehorses. After a quarter
of a millennium of institutional evolution, it is not surprising that reform was
needed, and these agreed changes sat naturally as part of a much wider
modernisation programme started earlier by BHB chairman Peter Savill.
The wider economic lessons of this case include the need for a competition
authority to address the efﬁciency motives for apparently anticompetitive
agreements, the abolition of which may have severely negative side effects.
There should be serious consideration of the counterfactual. It is also impor-
tant to get the product deﬁnition right before rushing into multiple partial
‘market deﬁnitions’. Where different groups of consumers buy into the same
product and this creates externalities, great care is needed to make sure these
externalities are appropriately addressed. This has been a common theme of
much recent economic research on what have become known as ‘two-sided
markets’. Competition authorities should also beware of getting drawn inap-
propriately into commercial disputes. With huge sums of money at stake,
businesses will work through every available court using every available law to
try to gain a larger slice of the cake, even when this reduces the size of the cake.
The best way to limit the consequent inefﬁciencies is to focus clearly on
economic effects and for economists to make the economic arguments under-
stood by the competition agencies and courts.
47 This is an example of how bidding for the market can provide an alternative to more standard
competition. This approach is familiar in the presence of natural monopoly (e.g. TV or rail franchises)
where there are well-known dangers of ex-post compliance and renegotiation (Williamson, 1976). In the
case of ﬁxture auctions, such dangers are minimised by the presence of alternative racecourses which
could credibly take over a ﬁxture if the leaseholder tried to renegotiate.
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Unfortunately, the legal issues in this case have been much harder to sort
out. This case has links with a number of others which together touch on an
enormous range of competition laws related to restrictive agreements, data-
base rights, exploitative pricing, media rights and state aid. The courts have
found the sale of pre-race data particularly confusing: is it excessive to
negotiate a price of £100 million for something that costs only £5 million to
compile? Or is £100 million a ‘fair price’ for something that provides access
to a product costing many times that to create and which generates the buyer
£1 billion in gross proﬁts? Early court decisions and statements supported the
BHB position (High Court, 2001; Advocate General of ECJ, July 2004). Later
ones went against (ECJ, November 2004; UK Court of Appeal, July 2005), in
particular undermining the rights over pre-race data. The last of these forced
the UK Minister for Sport to agree that the HBLB must continue the Levy
system until an alternative commercial mechanism can be found (though
there appears to be no practical alternative to the sale of pre-race data). In a
related case on the sale of pre-race data to Attheraces, a proposed television
channel, the case was set up as an abuse of dominance by BHB, which lost on
excessive pricing in the High Court (December 2005) before winning in the
Court of Appeal (February 2007).48 All this has created huge uncertainty and
delayed the modernisation programme. Non-specialist courts clearly ﬁnd
these issues very difﬁcult, thus providing an object lesson in the value of the
economic approach to competition analysis.
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